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CHILDREN ARE HUMAN
by: Kim Hai Pearson*
ABSTRACT
There are great benefits to be had should the United States, one of the global
leaders in economic strength and political power, ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). The mystery of the United
States’s ultimate reluctance to ratify the CRC, despite the nation’s central role
in the drafting process, has been interrogated for years. Scholars and policy-
makers have developed compelling narratives regarding obstacles to the
United States’s ratification and implementation of the CRC. However well-
reasoned the arguments for ratification are, there has been little progress in
persuading the United States to ratify the CRC.
While the work toward ratification should continue on every level, informal
implementation before ratification would be advantageous and in line with
historical methods of reform in the United States. One area that has been over-
looked to the advantage of minority and vulnerable populations is domestic
relations courts in the United States. In the United States, children’s rights ad-
vocacy work should be conducted like cause advocacy for historically disfa-
vored groups to achieve legal recognition and protection of their rights. For
example, parenting equality efforts were primarily focused on creating change
in individual courts over time, allowing advocates to teach judicial officers
and other legal decision-makers about positive outcomes for children of les-
bian and gay parents while dispelling myths, misperceptions, and negative ste-
reotypes about sexual minorities. Similarly, other disfavored parents, like
working mothers, religious, and racial minorities, have used individual court
cases to advocate and educate until new, progressive norms are adopted as
national standards. Advocates for children’s rights should adopt institutional
change theory and tailor cause advocacy efforts to implement the CRC princi-
ples in local domestic relations courts. Focusing on change from within insti-
tutions may shift legal norms more quickly, so children are recognized as fully
human and thus rights holders in the United States, rather than relying on
external legislative changes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The children are always ours, every single one of them, all over the
globe; and I am beginning to suspect that whoever is incapable of rec-
ognizing this may be incapable of morality.”
—James Baldwin1
Resistance to international human rights law continues to pervade
the United States legal system. The United States is the only member
state of the United Nations to not ratify the CRC,2 one of the most
widely supported core human rights conventions. The CRC “reflects
universal aspirations and standards for the recognition, care, and pro-
tection of our most vulnerable population—children.”3 In the recent
past, the United States ratified Optional Protocols (“OP”) to the
CRC, which address children in armed conflict (“OPAC”)4 and com-
bat the exploitation, trafficking, and use of children in pornography
(“OPSC”).5 Optimists may consider the United States’s ratification of
the CRC’s OPs as a sign of progress. However, the United States took
pains to ensure that the OPs could be ratified without ratifying the
main Convention itself.
There are compelling and persuasive theories about the United
States’s resistance to ratifying the CRC and endorsing it as the “au-
thoritative expression of children’s rights.”6 The primary reasons
1. James Baldwin, Notes on the House of Bondage, NATION (Nov. 1, 1980), https:/
/www.thenation.com/article/notes-house-bondage [https://perma.cc/T442-96CC].
2. Yvonne Vissing, Child Rights in the United States: 25 Years Later and Count-
ing, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: TAKING
STOCK AFTER 25 YEARS AND LOOKING AHEAD 73 (Ton Liefaard & Julia Sloth-Niel-
sen eds., 2017).
3. Cris R. Revaz, An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF
TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 9 (Jonathan Todres,
Mark E. Wojcik & Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006).
4. G.A. Res. 54/263, annex I, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (May 25, 2000) [here-
inafter Children in Armed Conflict].
5. G.A. Res. 54/263, annex II, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (May
25, 2000).
6. Jonathan Todres, Analyzing the Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL301.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-APR-21 10:01
2021] CHILDREN ARE HUMAN 497
presented are (1) sovereignty concerns based on attitudes that the
United States is a moral force in international laws, but should be im-
mune from international jurisdiction; (2) the current legal regime sub-
sumes children’s rights into parents’ rights or, in the alternative, to
local state government; and (3) popular beliefs that children in the
United States have adequate legal protection in the existing system.
The central concerns that prevent the United States from ratifying the
CRC continue to exist and appear to be, in the current political land-
scape, filled with nationalistic, isolationist rhetoric, which is more per-
sistent than ever.7
The current United States legal system cannot intervene effectively
on behalf of children.8 The system does not recognize that children
are fully human and rights holders. Instead, it conflates the concept of
“not fully adult” with “not fully human” and “incapable of being a
rights holder.”9 In recent years, the juvenile justice system has made
progress in recognizing children’s diminished decision-making capac-
ity. Notably, children in the United States can be tried as adults based
on the nature and severity of their crimes; during the 1990s, “approxi-
mately 210,000 to 260,000 children under the age of eighteen were
processed in the adult court.”10 Only in recent years have advocates
fought for recognition that children have diminished capacity to un-
derstand the consequences of their actions and therefore should not
be held to adult standards of accountability.11
Childhood, in the United States’s popular imagination, is a time of
innocence to be protected by adults.12 Traditionally, the locus of chil-
dren’s interests in the United States’s legal imagination has been set-
tings like custody, removal, adoption, welfare, and dependency—
areas where children’s interests link up with parents’ rights and are
only seen as interests via adults’ articulation of children’s best inter-
THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATI-
FICATION 19 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik & Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006).
7. See Vissing, supra note 2, at 73–74.
8. See id. at 82.
9. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Changing Status of the Child, in THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 51 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik &
Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006).
10. Rosemary C. Sarri & Jeffrey J. Shook, Human Rights and Juvenile Justice in
the United States, in CHILDREN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 197, 209 (Mark Ensalaco & Linda
C. Majka eds., 2005).
11. See generally Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 333 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
12. See generally KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD, OR GROWING
SIDEWAYS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2009); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE
PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1981); DAVID F.
LANCY, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD: CHERUBS, CHATTEL, CHANGELINGS
(2d ed. 2015).
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ests.13 There has been little need conceptually to separate children’s
rights from parent’s rights. The current legal regime that addresses
children, family law, welfare and dependency, and juvenile law is be-
lieved to be a responsive and satisfactory model of rights, based solely
on protecting children as a vulnerable population, not as agentic sub-
jects. However, there are children’s issues that are becoming more
pressing domestically that do not fit within the traditional model of
protecting children’s rights through the conduit of parental rights and
interests.
As more issues that United States citizens perceive to be the pre-
serve of international law14 make their way into domestic law settings,
the demands for solutions will quickly outstrip capacity in the United
States legal system. United States legal frameworks, such as domestic
relations courts as they are currently constituted, are not likely to be
prepared to humanely address issues. These children face unique chal-
lenges, such as international trafficking, transborder travel, wide-
spread sexual assault of migrant children by United States
government agents,15 and trauma from childhood violence, circum-
stances that result from the spreading effects of global armed conflicts,
war, and natural disasters. Additionally, Special Rapporteur Professor
Phillip Alston’s 2017 report revealed that problems thought to plague
13. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. See, e.g., Sam McFarland, International Differences in Support for Human
Rights, 12 SOCIETIES WITHOUT BORDERS 1, 13–14 (2017) (stating United States citi-
zens generally support civil rights over economic rights, but attitudes about global
cooperation to support civil rights remain divided, meaning that there is a political
divide regarding how the United States should treat other countries); see generally
Public Uncertain, Divided Over America’s Place in the World, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/05-05-2016-
Foreign-policy-APW-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU7J-KMPE]. Unsurprisingly,
there are beliefs that individual states should be responsible for problems such as
natural disasters, economic challenges, development, and sustainability in light of
American attitudes toward individual wealth or poverty, as opposed to beliefs that  it
is the government’s responsibility to set policies that promote income equality. An-
other effect of isolationist and individualist attitudes in the United States is its with-
drawal from the global stage as a leader in human rights law. See Michael Posner,
Why U.S. Withdrawal from the Human Rights Council Is a Dangerous Leadership
Mistake, FORBES (June 19, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaelposner/2018/06/19/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-un-human-rights-council/
#67616ad3de2b [https://perma.cc/39Y9-XJ7U] (opining about the United States’s
“headlong retreat from the [global] leadership position it has occupied since World
War II”); Stewart M. Patrick, Human Rights Safeguards Take a Backseat in New
Global Economics Institutions, COUNCIL FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://
www.cfr.org/blog/human-rights-safeguards-take-backseat-new-global-economics-insti-
tutions [https://perma.cc/D64A-Y7MT] (observing that the U.S. “appears to be relin-
quishing its role as a proponent of international human rights”).
15. Mathew Haag, Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They Were Sexually
Abused in U.S. Detention Centers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/immigrant-children-sexual-abuse.html [https://
perma.cc/2XJZ-5QNP].
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only developing states occur in the United States.16 He reported data
about the extreme poverty of 13.3 million children in the United
States.17 The rate of school shootings is on the rise.18 And while do-
mestic child removal rates have decreased in recent years, the prob-
lem persists.19 Finally, vulnerable children who are forcibly separated
from parents,20 or who arrive without parents and then are detained
by the United States government while migrating,21 present a moral
dilemma for a society that claims to protect children. Rather than re-
lying on political or social change alone to prompt ratification and
implementation of the CRC, children’s rights advocates should follow
juvenile justice’s cooperation model.22 Combining international
human rights principles with juvenile justice legal advocacy created a
model for changing United States legal protection for juveniles in the
16. Philip Alston, Statement on Visit to the USA, by Professor Philip Alston,
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UNITED




18. See Study Confirms Steady Rise in School Shootings, WEBMD (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20190124/study-confirms-steady-rise-in-
school-shootings#1 [https://perma.cc/K46K-UCMZ].
19. Child Welfare Outcomes 2010–2014: Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS.: CHILD.’S BUREAU i–ii (July 14, 2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/
resource/cwo-10-14 [https://perma.cc/SX6Z-XVXV] (reporting decrease in number of
children in foster care in the years 2005–2014, from 515,000 to 415,000; however, the
decrease was significant for years 2010–2013 at 400,000, increasing again in 2014 to
415,000); see also Child Welfare Outcomes 2015: Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: CHILD.’S BUREAU ii (June 13, 2018), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/cwo-2015 [https://perma.cc/J5QG-CDRW] (reporting
428,000 children in foster care in 2015); Number of Children in Foster Care Continues
to Increase, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS. (Nov.
30, 2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/media/press/2017/number-of-children-in-foster-
care-continues-to-increase [https://perma.cc/4U2D-UM2Z] (reporting that at the end
of the fiscal year 2016, the number of children in foster care was 437,500).
20. Camila Domonoske & Richard Gonzales, What We Know: Family Separation
and ‘Zero Tolerance’ at the Border, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 19, 2018, 2:17 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621065383/what-we-know-family-separation-and-zero-
tolerance-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/7SVY-3ZQ2].
21. See Caitlin Dickerson, Detention of Migrant Children Has Skyrocketed to
Highest Levels Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Nat9tC [https://
perma.cc/Y4UL-DMTY]; see also ACLU Obtains Documents Showing Widespread
Abuse of Child Immigrants in U.S. Custody, AM. C.L. UNION (May 22, 2018), https://
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-obtains-documents-showing-widespread-abuse-child-immi-
grants-us-custody [https://perma.cc/HG6A-T5RH] (detailing abuses suffered by unac-
companied minor immigrant children); Dan Barry et al., Cleaning Toilets, Following
Rules: A Migrant Child’s Days in Detention, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2018), https://
nyti.ms/2NQcb0D [https://perma.cc/AHF9-V59B].
22. See Bernardine Dohrn, The Surprising Role of the CRC in a Non-State-Party,
in LITIGATING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 84–85 (Ton Liefaard
& Jaap E. Doek eds., 2015) (explaining that juvenile justice reform involved a com-
plex strategy that integrated international standards).
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criminal system.23 In the same vein, CRC advocates could work with
institutional, legal actors at the domestic court level to create the con-
ditions for implementing the CRC principles. Viewing the entirety of
domestic relations courts as an institution writ large, rather than as
individual, regional, local entities, opens up new approaches to intro-
ducing the CRC core principles into the United States’s legal land-
scape. Of particular interest and relevance is institutional change
theory.
Institutional change theory describes how institutions change;
changing over time in positive directions is one option. Where there is
ambiguity in interpretation of the rules and insiders act to improve,
not destroy, the institution by maximizing the change through inter-
pretation refers to “conversion” in institutional change theory.24 In
the United States, the little-seen and often-used battleground for
shaping social norms around childhood, parenting, marriage, and sex-
uality takes place in domestic relations courts.25 There is greater dis-
cretion in the judiciary to interpret the few standards available—most
of which are lists of factors26 that help guide judges in making deci-
sions for the individuals at bar, not for national advocacy groups inter-
ested in large-scale legal gestures to spur reform. Instead, each
individual case builds over time into a sort of national standard as
more states make decisions about various socio-legal issues in the con-
text of domestic relations. Importantly, these courts are spaces for
radical reform in which children’s rights advocates should use “con-
version” to introduce CRC principles everyday legal parlance about
children and families.27
This piece contains three parts. Part Two provides a brief overview
of the CRC, explaining why it is a critical, core human rights conven-
tion. This Part presents justifications for the United States’s refusal to
ratify the CRC as a socio-political matter. However, no matter the
justifications for refusing to ratify or the critiques levelled against the
CRC, the United States should not continue refusing to incorporate
international human rights principles. There is no requirement to en-
23. Id.
24. Id. at 17–18.
25. Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the
Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 766–68
(1999) (discussing how judicial decisions reflect and influence social norms).
26. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Di-
rect Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381,
417 (2011) (discussing the importance of the court’s discretion in child abuse cases);
In re Marriage of Patterson, 920 P.2d 450, 454 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the
guidelines that the Kansas Supreme Court adopted for child support cases).
27. James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional
Change, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER
18 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010).
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force all of the CRC mandates,28 and ratification would be an expres-
sive act that signals inclusion in the international community as a peer,
not a colonizing force that makes laws but does not submit itself to
them.
The second Part provides a snapshot of conditions for children in-
ternationally and in the United States. The exceptionalism that ob-
scures mainstream perceptions about children in developing economic
states as compared to children in the United States may be contribut-
ing to pushback against the CRC. Popular belief in the United States
is that children in the United States do not need the protection of the
CRC.29 As data begins to show otherwise—that the children are not
all right—the United States may be prepared to begin shoring up chil-
dren’s rights with international human rights principles.30 This Part
next presents the progress made in the realm of United States juvenile
justice and explores the role international human rights played in re-
cent decisions, demonstrating that children are a compelling matter of
concern and strategic cause advocacy is a formula that works to move
the United States toward embracing human rights principles. The
strides made in United States juvenile death penalty and detention
cases can be transferred to other areas of law that touch on children’s
rights by employing a similar framework of institutional “conver-
sion.”31 If children’s rights advocates in the United States conceptual-
ize the recent progress made in juvenile justice issues as an example of
institutional change theory at work and transfer it to other legal set-
tings where it can also be effective, the aspiration of implementing the
CRC’s principles into the United States legal system can be realized.
The third Part explores the possibility that institutional change the-
ory, particularly “conversion” of an institution by insiders to better
and more progressive actions, is the most promising route toward cre-
ating the conditions necessary for the United States to ratify and im-
plement the human rights principles embodied in the CRC. An
excellent example of the space in which radical reform by “conver-
sion” would work is the vast network of United States domestic rela-
tions courts.
The state courts, as opposed to federal district courts, are both the
laboratory of the nation-state that serve in producing, over time, the
legal contours of socio-political issues and the trenches in which daily,
seemingly small skirmishes turn into the roots of the national legal
28. Patrick Geary, CRC in Court: The Case Law of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, CHILD. RTS. INT’L NETWORK 1, 5 (2012), https://archive.crin.org/docs/
CRC_in_Court_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMS3-8ESL].
29. Joe Lauria, Why Won’t the US Ratify the UN’s Children’s Rights Convention?,
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-wont-the-us-ratify-th_b_61
95594 (Jan. 25, 2015) [https://perma.cc/DCG9-HGTE].
30. Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Kids Are (Not) All Right, N.Y. TIMES (April
17, 2013), https://nyti.ms/100RYDb [https://perma.cc/K4JB-DG8X].
31. See Dohrn, supra note 22, at 84–85.
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standards for families and children.32 Other disfavored and marginal-
ized groups have long fought for their civil rights, religious liberty,
gender equality, and other progressive ideals in local domestic rela-
tions courts. In the same way that marginalized groups have rallied
and advocated using strategic litigation advocacy, so too should chil-
dren’s rights advocates harness the possibility of institutional “conver-
sion” to introduce and normalize the CRC principles into the legal
discourse regarding children and families. Accordingly, the conditions
would be ripe for embracing the CRC. The conditions would be cre-
ated (much like they were for ratifying the Optional Protocols related
to child soldiers, exploitation, trafficking, and pornography) for CRC
principles to be seen as natural extensions of existing United States
law and policy.
II. THE CRC AND THE UNITED STATES AS THE LONE HOLDOUT
Unsurprisingly, the United States has long had an isolationist and
individualist approach to international relationships, particularly in
the realm of international human rights. The possibility that interna-
tional standards and punishments would be imposed on the United
States is framed in the United States as an abhorrent abdication of
self-governance rights.33 Nonetheless, the willingness to impose
United States’s norms, laws, and punishments is perceived as natural
by the same polity due to the popular perception that the United
States has the moral high ground in human rights, civilization, eco-
nomic status, and power on the international scene stemming from its
cherished self-conception as a “city upon a hill,”34 shining as a moral
guide for others.35 The seeming lack of awareness regarding the con-
ceptual disconnect between the United States’s role in drafting trea-
ties, including imposing norms and standards from the United States
into treaty mandates, and its refusal to be subject to such treaties is
disappointing to the global human rights community and not surpris-
32. See Lin, supra note 25, at 766–68 (discussing how judicial decisions reflect and
influence social norms).
33. See Lauria, supra note 29.
34. See JOHN WINTHROP, A MODEL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY 47 (1630); John F.
Kennedy, U.S. President-Elect, City Upon a Hill Speech (Jan. 9, 1961) (transcript
available in the John F. Kennedy Library & Museum); Ronald Reagan, U.S. Presi-
dent, Farewell Address (Jan. 11, 1989) (transcript available in the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library and Museum); George W. Bush, U.S. President, Address to Joint
Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available in
the Washington Post Archives).
35. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, VOLUME II,
ch. IX (Henry Reeve trans., 2013) (the call to be as a light shining on the hill is a
biblical reference used to describe and justify the colonization of pre-existing societies
in the Americas as religious groups settled in the northeastern coast of North
America. Alexis de Tocqueville is the first to describe America as “exceptional” and,
citing to John Winthrop, tying the city on the hill imagery with American exceptional-
ism together).
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ing given the exceptionalist attitude toward international human
rights law despite the United States’s critical role in designing interna-
tional rights systems post-World War II.36
The mistaken belief that children are all doing well37 in the United
States without the CRC—and that therefore there is no obligation to
support the CRC—is only part of the problem when it comes to ob-
structing ratification and implementation of the treaty. The mistake is
two-fold. The first is that there are children suffering from poor health
and negative social outcomes in the United States.38 Just because
there are statistically fewer children suffering in the United States as
compared to other countries does not obviate the problem of individ-
ual children’s suffering in the United States. The second is that the
privilege of economic and political stability underlying children’s posi-
tive outcomes in developed, industrialized countries like the United
States is often built on the unacknowledged, exploitative socio-eco-
nomic behaviors of global actors.39 Supposing children in the United
States have good outcomes—without taking into account the larger
context explaining how they have a disproportionate share of re-
sources as compared to the rest of the world’s children—could easily
lead one to mistake positive outcomes in the United States as a  result
of individual, national, or even parental merit, rather than a general
distribution issue. What statistician and writer Nassim Taleb calls the
“pull of the sensational”40 is another explanation for the United
States’s inactivity relative to children’s interests generally. He offers
examples of individual, sensational anecdotes that generate popular
interest and an outsized media effect, when simultanesouly,there are
many enduring worse suffering who are ignored in favor of the sensa-
tional story.41 He provides the example of an Italian toddler who fell
36. See Ed Bates, History, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 27–28 (Daniel
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2d ed. 2014); Jack Donnelly,
The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 281, 291 (2007).
37. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 16; see also Children, UNITED NATIONS, https://
www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/children/index.html [https://perma.cc/C7G6-
LMWF] (reporting children’s outcomes worldwide); The State of the World’s Children
2019 Statistical Tables, UNICEF (Oct. 2019), https://data.unicef.org/resources/dataset/
sowc-2019-statistical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/HKK5-DZN3] (providing an interactive
table that allows users to select the United States as a country to analyze in compari-
son to a region; although the measures for many outcomes exceed the outcomes for
the rest of the global population, that does not obscure the reality that a percentage of
children in the United States continues to suffer poor health and social outcomes).
38. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 16.
39. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012) (exploring how
past and present political and economic institutions, and colonialism in particular,
have led nations to divergent outcomes).
40. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 79–80 (2007).
41. Id.
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down a well in the 1970s.42 The popular imagination was caught in the
drama of the child’s rescue, but there was no similar outcry about the
children caught in the Lebanese civil war, which involved car bombs
being detonated in the Christian portion of Beirut.43
Other mistaken beliefs are much more difficult to tackle. There
have already been three decades of analysis and persuasive writing
aimed at correcting misperceptions about the CRC’s nature and char-
acter.44 Despite all the writing and rhetoric, no matter how persuasive
and compelling, no successful national movement to formally ratify
the CRC has emerged. Ironically, the United States proposed several
of the provisions in the CRC,45 becoming a key influencer in the nor-
mative vision of the CRC. This was much to the dismay of feminist
and post-colonial critics who saw such involvement as further solidi-
fying the United States’s heteronormative, patriarchal vision into
global legal conceptions of family.46 Nonetheless, the United States
declined to ratify the CRC, even though nearly every other member
country of the United Nations ratified it.47 One might draw the con-
clusion that the United States wished to make certain there was no
misunderstanding about where it stood with regard to ratification.48
When the United States ratified the OPAC and OPSC of the CRC, it
did so with an express provision allowing itself to ratify the OPs with-
out ratifying the general Convention.49
The United States provided multiple proposals that appeared in the
final version of the CRC,50 and yet the United States went on to op-
pose language that would have “referred to the CRC as the most au-
thoritative expression of children’s rights.”51 Jonathan Todres
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Didier Reynaert, Maria Bouverne-de-Bie & Stijn Vandevelde, A Re-
view of Children’s Rights Literature Since the Adoption of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, 16 CHILDHOOD 518, 518 (2009).
45. See Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting the Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Creating a New World for Children, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 9,
26 (1998).
46. See generally Frances Olsen, Children’s Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 INT’L J. L. & FAM. 192
(1992); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Chil-
dren’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1986).
47. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, No.
27531, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (showing current treaty ratification status; the United States is
the only country on the list not to have ratified).
48. Luisa Blanchfield, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1, 4–5 (Apr. 1, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40484.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS4G-G9MB].
49. Treaty Doc 106-37, 106th Congress 2d Session, v (2000); Consideration of Re-
ports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 8 (1) of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, ¶ A(1)(a)(11), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/USA/3-4 (Sept. 15, 2016).
50. Todres, supra note 6, at 19.
51. Id. at 19 n.1.
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considered why the United States, as “one of the authors of the
CRC,” was then “the only remaining country that actively opposes
adoption of the CRC.”52 Todres identifies and critiques the reasons
presented for non-ratification, focusing primarily on concerns about
threats to national sovereignty and parents’ rights.53 He also notes
that the root of resistance to the CRC is the “concern that the CRC is
‘anti-parent’ and will undermine the role of parents in raising their
children.”54 The critique about parent-child relationships is a layered
problem because it does not simply involve a political obstacle, but a
moral and religious component, as well. In the United States, parental
rights are deeply tied to religious education, and a suspicion of gov-
ernmental interference in family sexual privacy cases persists.55
The patchwork of cases governing family sexual privacy can be as
narrowly construed as prophylactic use for family planning or as
broadly encompassing as marriage equality rights for sexual minori-
ties. One has only to look at the current staple of popular family law
casebooks56 used in United States law schools to see the wide variety
of cases that make up the canon of family sexual privacy cases. Gris-
wold57 and Eisenstadt58 are famous contraceptives cases that are typi-
cally taught to establish foundational principles, such as the sanctity of
the bedroom, when referring to the state’s reluctance to regulate sex-
ual activity for married and unmarried couples.59 On the other end of
the spectrum, the 2015 Obergefell case finally settled the question of
marriage equality for same-sex couples.60 In between those poles are
cases about the rights of parents to educate children, such as Meyer
and Pierce, which include an implicit recognition that parents have the
52. Id. at 19.
53. Id. at 20–30.
54. Id. at 20.
55. See generally James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: De-
bunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994) (critiquing par-
ents’ rights, particularly when religious values are elevated above children’s rights).
56. See generally JOHN E.B. MYERS, EXPERIENCING FAMILY LAW (2013); DOUG-
LAS E. ABRAMS, SUSAN V. MANGOLD & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE
LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 2017); D. KELLY WEISBERG, MOD-
ERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2020); LESLIE HARRIS, LEE E.
TEITELBAUM & JUNE R. CARBONE, FAMILY LAW (5th ed. 2014); ANN LAQUER ESTIN,
DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (1st ed. 2013); WALTER
WADLINGTON, RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON, DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2017); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW (7th ed. 2014); JAMES DWYER, FAMILY LAW: THEORETICAL, COMPAR-
ATIVE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES (2012); JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2019).
57. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
59. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1164, 1183 n.94, 1197 (1992).
60. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680–81 (2015).
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right to have children.61 In other words, Meyer and Pierce are flexible
cases that apply a narrow construction limited to educational rights to
very expansive views that parents have the fundamental right to have
children and raise them as they see fit, without unwarranted state in-
tervention.62 This quick sketch—highlighting the basic contours of
constitutionally protected parents’ rights to the having and raising of
children with the built-in presumption that parents act in the best in-
terest of their children (“BIOC”)63—is the groundwork for resistance
to perceived state interference or disruption of parental rights.64 Any
interference from the state, particularly for intact families that have
little-to-no oversight or regulation by the state, tends to be perceived
as an infringement of parents’ privacy rights. Relatedly, the free exer-
cise of religion and the privacy rights extended to parents in the up-
bringing of children protect families who observe religious beliefs that
eschew modern medical intervention.65
In the space between protecting children from harm and providing
greater protection to families lies the persistent reality that family
members, at times, pose the largest threat to children.66 Violence
against children, the exploitation of children for sex, labor, and/or or-
gans, and other harmful practices oftentimes happen because of exter-
nal pressures on families and their communities.67 Despite the reality
that family members’ actions may warrant intervention between par-
ents and children, Todres argues that there is a misperception of the
CRC as an intervention tool for the government to interfere between
61. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
62. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
63. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 89–90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur
substantive due process case law includes a strong presumption that a parent will act
in the best interest of her child . . . .”).
64. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (characteriz-
ing procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man”). As Justice Brennan noted in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (internal citations omitted): “[i]f the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
65. See generally David Orentlicher, Law, Religion, and Health Care, 8 U.C. IR-
VINE L. REV. 617, 622–25 (2018); Misty Boyer, Death by Religious Exemption: Parents
Refusing Their Child Necessary Medical Treatment Based upon Their Own Religious
Beliefs - Should States Endorse a System That Denies Necessary Medical Treatment to
Children?, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 147, 150 n.15 (2004); Jennifer L.
Hartsell, Mother May I . . . Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treat-
ment for Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 501–02
(1999).
66. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (ex-
plaining how a father abused his four-year-old child over time, despite awareness of
the abuse by state actors, resulting in traumatic head injuries so severe that the child
succumbed to a coma and suffered significant brain damage).
67. INT’L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, INT’L LABOUR
ORG., CHILD TRAFFICKING: THE ILO’S RESPONSE THROUGH IPEC 3 (2007).
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parents and children.68 Todres’ 2006 observation suggests that the
stickiness of legal ideas about children should not be underestimated.
For example, in 1986, Martha Minow argued that an obstacle to con-
sistent legal treatment has been due to “legal conceptions affecting
children—legal conceptions insensitive to the relationships children
have and those they need.”69 Her call to action includes “develop[ing]
a perspective on children’s rights that refrains from comparing the
abilities of children and adults and instead addresses their mutual
needs and connections.”70 Years later, developing an approach to the
law that is mutually reinforcing of adults’ and children’s interests has
yet to be realized. Todres continues the fight and builds on Minow’s
argument by advocating for the CRC’s ratification and its capacity to
take into account children’s rights vis-à-vis their relationships to par-
ents, family members, other adults, and the state.71 According to
Todres, the CRC heightens family protection, giving parents greater
protection to raise their children and protecting children’s rights72
from unwarranted state intervention. Todres’ critique of the mis-
perceptions that the CRC undermines parental rights “demonstrates
the considerable lengths to which the CRC goes to emphasize the
great value that it places on the rights and duties of parents in raising
their children.”73
The CRC is clear that it “does not allow parents to act without im-
punity toward their children.”74 Just as in the United States domestic
legal system, there are laws and policies in place for the state to inter-
vene when parents harm their children, so too the CRC “obligates
states to act to protect children” from harm.75 Tragically, in some parts
of the United States it is the state that currently poses one of the
greatest dangers to children. The state separated parents from chil-
dren at national borders in detention camps76 and failed to correct
child removal rates that unfairly impacted low-income status and ra-
cial minority families.77 The resistance to ratification sounds in ne-
oliberalism, balking at the idea the state will be required to act as a
duty bearer to rights holders. DeShaney stands as a tragic example of
the underlying fear of state responsibility to children as a positive, ac-
68. See Todres, supra note 6, at 20.
69. Minow, supra note 46, at 2.
70. Id.
71. See Todres, supra note 6, at 31.
72. See id. at 20–27.
73. Id. at 27.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Ron Nixon, U.S. Loses Track of Another 1500 Migrant Children, Investiga-
tors Find, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/us/polit-
ics/us-migrant-children-whereabouts-.html [https://perma.cc/LP75-F8ZY].
77. Children and Adolescents in the United States’ Adult Criminal Justice System,
INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS. 9, 70–71 (2018), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/re-
ports/pdfs/Children-USA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK95-P5FB].
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tive duty.78 In DeShaney, the child and his mother claimed that by
failing to remove him from his father’s care after warnings of physical
abuse, the state violated the child’s “liberty interest in bodily integ-
rity.”79 The Court’s response is representative of the defensive posture
of U.S. jurisprudence. Rather than affirmatively act to protect citi-
zens—in this case, children—the law is a tool to protect the state from
overreaching into individual rights and liberty interests. Notably,
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while
it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be
read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means.80
Since the state is not a duty bearer with a responsibility to act affirma-
tively to protect children, the Court held that there was no violation of
constitutional law:81 “a State’s failure to protect an individual against
private violence generally does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause.”82 Now, more than ever, the state’s seemingly unlim-
ited power and its ability to wrongfully intervene in families militates
toward adopting the CRC. The misperceptions about the state’s abil-
ity to intervene, being increased by ratification of the CRC, further
the state’s ability to create the conditions for losing thousands of chil-
dren, preventing families from ever reuniting, and subjecting children
to sexual and physical assault and other traumatic experiences in insti-
tutions, foster care,83 and detention centers84 with impunity.
78. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
79. Id. at 191.
80. Id. at 195.
81. Id. at 202.
82. Id. at 197.
83. Foster Care Statistics 2018, CHILD.’S BUREAU (May 2020), https://
www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCV9-WJ5C]; Ron Has-
kins, Driving Better Outcomes for Children in Foster Care, BROOKINGS (Feb. 14,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/02/14/driving-better-outcomes-
for-children-in-foster-care/ [https://perma.cc/2FEB-GYY7] (noting that approxi-
mately 13% of 442,995 children placed in foster care in 2017 “were placed in congre-
gate care . . . , where youth experience poorer outcomes than those in family-care
placements”).
84. See Nixon, supra note 76; Cynthia Pompa, Immigrant Kids Keep Dying in CBP
Detention Centers, and DHS Won’t Take Accountability, ACLU (June 24, 2019, 12:45
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/
immigrant-kids-keep-dying-cbp-detention [https://perma.cc/455T-FD6S]; Associated
Press, Migrant Kids Split at Border Were Harmed in Foster Care, Claims Say, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/16/immigrant-children-
separated-border-abused-foster-care-claims/2027970001/ (Aug. 16, 2019, 7:33 AM)
[https://perma.cc/U46V-JW89]; Christopher Sherman, Martha Mendoza & Garance
Burke, US Held Record Number of Migrant Children in Custody in 2019, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://apnews.com/015702afdb4d4fbf85cf5070cd2c6824 [https:/
/perma.cc/9XSU-2QWR]; Applied Rsch. Ctr., Shattered Families: The Perilous Inter-
section of Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, RACE FORWARD 1,
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The second major threat is to United States sovereignty should it
become beholden to other countries’ oversight through the ratifica-
tion of international human rights treaties.85 This fear is based on a
misperception that ratification of international human rights treaties
authorizes enforcement beyond self-reporting compliance with treaty
mandates and receiving commentary from other treaty parties.86 Re-
latedly, there are fears connected to the United States’s dual system of
federal and state laws,87 which is designed to allow individual states
within the country to manage local concerns, like the health, welfare,
and safety of their citizens. Opponents of the CRC refer to the United
States’s laws about capital punishment as an example of ceding local
state governance powers to the federal government.88 Federal govern-
ment powers end where the CRC is believed to begin, creating a com-
plicated relationship between a national, federal governmental body
dictating that the state should embrace an international standard for
laws and policies related to children and their rights. Even if the fed-
eral government, through its executive or legislative branch, were to
ratify the treaty, it would be left to the individual states to adopt and
implement the treaty mandates and thus would not undermine or
threaten local state governance.89 More importantly, the United
States could ratify the CRC without upholding every mandate, as
there are “limited enforcement mechanisms” built into the CRC.90
One way the CRC’s opponents in the United States have avoided the
problem of being an author who is not beholden to laws made for all
other global citizens is to emphasize the narrative that the treaty does
not need to be ratified because the existing legal scheme in place—the
United States Constitution and individual state constitutions—ade-
quately protects children’s rights in the same or better manner than
the CRC purports to do.91 By either justifying non-ratification with a
federalism concern or by claiming that the existing United States legal
protections are the equivalent of the CRC, American refusal to sub-
mit itself as an equal international actor persists. Another issue be-
tween aspiration and realization when it comes to ratifying the CRC is
the critiques levelled at the instrument. Whether it stems from philo-
sophical concerns about the CRC’s welfarist conception of children’s
rights or from feminist concerns that the CRC will be another tool of
43 (Nov. 2, 2011), https://www.raceforward.org/research/reports/shattered-families
[https://perma.cc/AN7M-ZJRP] [hereinafter Shattered].
85. Todres, supra note 6, at 20.
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 29.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 61 (acknowledging that children in the United
States enjoy some rights, but the United States is no longer a leader in protecting
children’s rights as compared to nation-states that implement the CRC).
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women’s oppression, it is useful to consider whether those critiques
are enough to justify refusal to ratify altogether. One critique is that it
is impossible to know what children want as they are incapable of ar-
ticulating their interests coherently.92 There are developmental reali-
ties that make it difficult to argue that children can process, let alone
articulate, their own self interests. The physical limitation of an inabil-
ity to predict and process future consequences from present choices is
just one aspect of assessing children’s capacity for holding and exercis-
ing rights. In United States domestic relations cases, particularly in
child custody determinations, the norm is to prevent children from
speaking directly in court.93 The psychic toll of being asked to choose
between parents or risking vulnerable children’s exploitation if there
are violent or abusive behaviors in the parent-child relationship are
real concerns that are met with in camera interviews, third-party ex-
pert witnesses, and other forms of children’s representatives such as
Guardian ad Litem.94
Another important critique is the unintentional negative outcomes
for women that come at the expense of helping children.95 Women’s
fates have been intertwined legally with children’s for so long that it is
still difficult to parse out rights, and there is a risk that these rights do
not flow in the same direction.96 Human rights laws have been used to
“improve, and perhaps already have improved the lives of women.”97
However, the framework that benefits some women’s lives has been
“dominated by men” with the result being a furtherance of the “inter-
national subordination of women.”98 While certainly the fates of wo-
men, often caregivers to children, are intertwined with children’s,
their suites of rights are not always in alignment.99 In addition to do-
mestic and familial concerns, there are other implications because of
the nature of a male-dominated legal framework.100 A prime example
of this point is OPAC,101 but there is a question about the strength of
the prohibition against child marriages. The practice of training and
92. But see David William Archard, Children’s Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Winter 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/rights-chil-
dren/ [https://perma.cc/9TZU-WNFW] (“Similarly the making by a child of a poor
choice is not conclusive evidence of her general incapacity to choose for herself. Wise
adults can occasionally make stupid decisions just as fools sometimes get it right.”).
93. See Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From “Best” to “Better”: The Interests of Children
and the Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REV. 633, 637–38 n.22 (1990).
94. Id. at 636.





100. Id. at 192.
101. Trevor Buck, ‘International Criminalisation and Child Welfare Protection’: The
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 CHILD. & SOC’Y
167, 168 (2008).
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deploying child soldiers largely impacts boys, and child marriages
largely impact girls.102
The OPSC focuses primarily on prohibiting the sale of children for
sex and/or organs.103 The Committee on the Rights of the Child, when
reporting about the implementation of the OPAC and OPSC, included
child marriage when children were traded for money.104 The Commit-
tee noted that Syrian Arab Republic communities were engaged in
the “practice of early and forced marriage and temporary marriages
involving girls as young as [twelve] years who are given in marriage in
exchange for money.”105 In addition to covering child marriage, even
if not explicitly in its substantive content, the OPSC in practice should
provide stronger forms of criminalization for wrongdoers and protec-
tion for children.106 Based solely on the amount of attentiveness to
women’s and children’s rights, child marriage, and other related op-
pressive practices, such as female genital mutilation,107 one might con-
clude that there is widespread consensus among world leaders about
the seriousness of harmful practices that impact women and children.
Despite attentiveness in drafting significant conventions and treaties
to address harmful practices that impact women and children, there
continues to be a significant gap between ratification and domestica-
tion.108 This gap is due, in part, to reservations that states make to
conventions and treaties.109 Per the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”),110 a sort of civil procedure “handbook” for the
interpretation of international human rights agreements, a reservation
is “any statement . . . that aims to restrict—either totally or partially—
the scope of the application of a given treaty,”111 unless the reserva-
tion is “contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant treaty,”112
which is prohibited. The use of reservations is contested as the excep-
102. Olsen, supra note 46, at 194.
103. Buck, supra note 101, at 168–70.
104. Id. at 174.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 168 (suggesting that “the Protocol’s implementation, though enhancing
international criminalisation of perpetrators, provides far weaker support for the wel-
fare protection of child victims”).
107. Nazila Ghanea, Women and Religious Freedom: Synergies and Opportunities,
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1, 7 (2017), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/
default/files/WomenandReligiousFreedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/J97H-7H8M] (illus-
trating, through a chart, the most “prevalent and well-documented of the harmful
practices” per the CRC and CEDAW that includes female genital mutilation, child
and/or forced marriage, polygamy, “honor” killings, and dowry-related violence).
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id.
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 333.
111. BAŞAK ÇALI & MARIANA MONTOYA, THE MARCH OF UNIVERSALITY?: RE-
LIGION-BASED RESERVATIONS TO THE CORE UN TREATIES AND WHAT THEY TELL
US ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIVERSALITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2017).
112. Id.
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tions in some cases threaten to obviate the rule altogether.113 Fran-
coise Hampson, submitting a report to the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations, observed that the VCLT “regime [fa-
vors] the reserving State.”114 There is no clear oversight or governing
body that determines whether a reservation is incompatible with a
treaty’s object and purpose.115 If there are no objections from other
member states within a prescribed amount of time, the silence is taken
as consent to the reservation.116 Some treaty parties may not object to
reservations that states make, even if they negatively impact women
and children, in the hope of moving closer to the overarching goal of
persuading more states to ratify a convention. Even with the poten-
tially ineffective bar against reservations that are “incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty,” upholding women’s and chil-
dren’s human rights obscures the reality that many women and chil-
dren continue to be subject to human rights violations.117 Because
child marriage practices are considered a part of cultural and/or relig-
ious practices, and “religion is among the asserted grounds for wo-
men’s rights violations, though this invocation of religion may well be
covering a range of socioeconomic, traditional, political, and other
objectives for states and have a tenuous relationship with ‘religion’ as
such,” the end result is that other rights and interests are prioritized
over women’s and children’s rights.118
After fighting so long for the liberation of and rights for women,
advocating for children’s rights is critical. As an example, one can see
that rights may not flow seamlessly together in cases where women
and children are economically vulnerable. For years in the United
States, heterosexual couples have specialized in the division of labor;
generally speaking, men have worked outside the home, and women
have provided the bulk of care work for children and the elderly.119 A
recent study dismayingly showed that in several decades, the number
of women opting out of the workplace to provide care work has re-
mained steady, despite economic pressures and increased opportuni-
ties for school and work.120 Having more women stay home to provide
113. Francoise Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues: Reservations to Human
Rights Treaties (Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Final Working Paper E/CN.4Sub.2/2004/42,
2004).
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Ghanea, supra note 107, at 7–8.
119. Charlotte J. Patterson, Erin L. Sutfin & Megan Fulcher, Division of Labor
Among Lesbian and Heterosexual Parenting Couples: Correlates of Specialized Versus
Shared Patterns, 11 J. ADULT DEV. 179, 179 (2004).
120. Leila Schochet, The Child Care Crisis is Keeping Women Out of the
Workforce, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 28, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2019/03/28/467488/child-
care-crisis-keeping-women-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/6LYB-9JLL].
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childcare means that women are often a child’s primary caregiver.121
In the event of a divorce, women without work experience or educa-
tional attainments are at a distinct disadvantage.122 If there is no
equalizing of pay and accounting for unremunerated care work for the
marital community, women are often left in dire economic states.123
To then invest in children the right to state their preferences or inter-
ests for a parental caregiver is fraught with difficulty. Another related
concern is that of reproductive rights. In the United States, there has
been an ongoing tension between women’s bodily autonomy rights
and the state’s interest in protecting fetal life.124 To press the question
further in the case of children’s rights, the spectre of children’s rights
overcoming women’s rights, particularly when it is unclear that there
is any consensus on which rights and interests should be paramount in
abortion cases, gives pause.
Although one might believe that these critiques militate toward
non-ratification of the CRC, that would be a mistake. Thoughtful crit-
ics acknowledge beneficial aspects of the CRC and then seek to im-
prove it. For example, John Eekelaar’s critique of welfarist
approaches125 to children’s rights is centered on the dilemma of the
question: “[I]f someone has the right to determine my welfare, do I
have rights in any meaningful sense?”126 Currently, in the United
States, adults have built domestic relations legal doctrine and practice
on determinations of “the best interest of the child” made by inter-
ested adults, rarely by the children themselves.127 Nevena Vučković-
Šahović notes that “the concept of the best interest of the child is well
known by professionals that work with or for children, the notion is
very difficult to define, and it has been the object of virulent criticism,
ranging from being called a hollow shell to the vase that one fills as
one pleases.”128 At times, courts may appoint a Guardian ad Litem to
speak on behalf of a child’s interests but often with a limited ability to
determine outcomes for the child at bar.129 Relying solely on parents’
conformity with the BIOC standard is fraught in legal systems that
121. Id.
122. Derek A. Kreager et al., Women’s Education, Marital Violence, and Divorce:
A Social Exchange Perspective, 75 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 565, 565 (2013).
123. Id. at 567.
124. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. See John Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking That Children Have Rights, 6
INT’L J.L. & FAM. 221, 221 (1992).
126. Id. at 223.
127. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
128. See Nevena Vučković-Šahović, Childhood and International Rights of the
Child, in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nevena Vučković-
Šahović, Jaap E. Doek & Jean Zermatten eds., 2012).
129. Muhlhauser, supra note 93, at 634–35.
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grant strong parental rights to the control and custody of children.130
The idea of strong parental rights, as opposed to recognizing chil-
dren’s rights separate from their parents’ rights, persists. Harry
Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that the language of children’s rights
and parental rights is inappropriate in a loving relationship.131 Instead,
in Brighouse and Swift’s model, parental rights are conceived as “ser-
vice to the governed,” aligning children’s interests with parents’ loving
governance.132 In contrast, Eekelaar’s vision of children’s rights aris-
ing from a relational practice rather than a moral obligation presents
rights as something philosophically substantive rather than a product
of external deliberations about another person’s rights.133 If a parent
may perceive her actions toward non-human life in terms of moral
obligation without conceding that such life has rights, except perhaps
metaphorically, so too could she view her actions toward a child (with-
out rights) in terms of moral obligation, not legal duty. “Righthood”
can only be realized when sufficient duties or powers are conferred on
others. So, while owing duties to others does not necessarily imply
that the others have rights (except in a formalistic sense), no one can
have rights unless the claims that they embody are protected by duties
on others.134 Eekelaar’s conception of children as rights holders rein-
forces the intimate tie between parents and children’s other caregivers
as having a duty to protect rights as a method for realizing rights.135
There is no conflation of the child’s rights with a legal or social pre-
sumption that parents’ and children’s interests align simply because
the parent-child relationship exists.136
Rather, Eekelaar advocates for children’s rights as an expression of
“what children say” that “must therefore lie at the root of any elabo-
ration of children’s rights.”137 This might be frightening or unrealistic
to adults who fear that children’s views are “[colored] by ignorance or
parental influence.”138 Thus, Eekelaar’s granular critique of the
CRC’s welfarist or protective approach to children’s rights is that
there is an assumption that adults will act in furtherance of children’s
rights, “not in derogation of the rights.”139 The radical reform that
Eekelaar suggests would be to recognize children’s humanity as the
basis for their rights and ability to make claims, so that, “from the
moment of their birth continuously into adulthood,” humans would
130. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce
and the child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
131. ADAM SWIFT & HARRY BRIGHOUSE, FAMILY VALUES: THE ETHICS OF PAR-
ENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS (2014).
132. Id. at 19
133. Eekelaar, supra note 125, at 228.
134. Eekelaar, supra note 125, at 227.
135. Id. at 228.
136. See generally id.
137. Id. at 228.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 233.
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have rights.140 Notwithstanding the room for improvement in concep-
tualizing children’s rights vis-à-vis their humanity, Eekelaar’s critique
assumes that the CRC is the baseline for recognizing children’s rights
and that reform should take place after the ratification and implemen-
tation of the CRC.141 Eekelaar’s critique seeks to imagine improve-
ments to the existing protection of children by first ratifying and next
tailoring the application as an ongoing project.142 However, viewing
the CRC as a fixed, static set of rules that must be ratified—ratifica-
tion that would suddenly provide standardized legal protection to chil-
dren—seems to have a stranglehold on those devoted to formal,
positive law. It is critical to understand that the CRC, like many laws,
is flexible and capacious in its ability to adjust to the individual cir-
cumstances of various children while also focusing on the humanity of
all children. In fact, this is much like Vučković-Šahović’s characteriza-
tion of the standard BIOC as a “rule in itself”143 that further lends
itself to becoming a “principle of interpretation” and an “indeterminate
legal concept which should be specified by practice.”144 In this way,
the rule that one must first take a child’s interests into account as a
“primary consideration” before one can use the BIOC concept to dis-
cover the specific way in which it applies to the child is different than
a fixed law. This approach reflects a tailoring of law to the subject at
bar and the dynamism of applying law to humans, not ideas or things.
Imagine that a judge has to determine whether a child should be re-
moved from her home. The baseline consideration, that parents act in
the best interest of their children, may not ultimately protect children
and represent the child’s interest as primary.145
Similarly, feminist scholar Frances Olsen’s critique acknowledges
the benefits of the CRC and voices concerns as a method for improv-
ing the CRC to extend benefits to more people, not to discard the
project entirely.146 Olsen’s critique of the CRC acknowledges that,
while there may be beneficial aspects to ratifying the CRC, there is
also the risk that the CRC could “be used to control and confine wo-
men.”147 There has been a connection between limiting women’s
rights in the furtherance of better outcomes for children, particularly
in the areas of reproductive rights and caregiving duties.148 As a voice
of caution, Olsen raises concerns that are not only valid, but that feed
directly into the conversations that should be included in protecting
children from sex trafficking, exploitation, and pornography. Again,
140. Id. at 234.
141. Id. at 231–34.
142. See id.
143. See Vučković-Šahović, supra note 128, at 97.
144. Id. at 98.
145. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
146. See generally Olsen, supra note 46.
147. Id. at 198.
148. Id. at 198–99.
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an ongoing critique of patriarchal systems is not a justification for
non-ratification of any international human rights convention, but a
guiding voice toward recognition of women as fully human.
III. PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES?
Against a backdrop of the United States’s historic reluctance to rat-
ify the CRC, as compared to the rest of the global community, this
Part provides a brief overview of the state of children in the world,
which justified the creation and use of a legal tool like the CRC to
authorize stronger legal protection for children. Minow’s case for the
CRC is animated by the need for a more consistent treatment of chil-
dren.149 She posits that “the inconsistent legal treatment of children
stems in some measure from societal neglect of children. The needs
and interests of children, difficult enough to address when highlighted,
are too often submerged below other societal interests. The domi-
nance of these other interests helps to explain the inconsistent treat-
ment of children.”150 There is plenty of room for optimism that the
United States’s recalcitrance to participate more actively in support-
ing international human rights may be waning. With the internet,
global travel, and greater global connectedness, the possibilities for
change exist and can be used more forcefully than before. Moreover,
the United States is not immune from pressure generated domestically
and internationally to fight the spread of child trafficking, sexual ex-
ploitation, pornography, and involvement in armed conflict.151 Unlike
current forms of domestic legal protection in the United States that
focus on  children’s rights only through the lens of parents and the
state (usually in criminal and welfare contexts), the CRC recognizes
that all children are rights holders because they are human and that
the nature of their rights is unique because of their status as children.
Vučković-Šahović argues the CRC is a critical human rights conven-
tion because “the definitions of fundamental rights of the child [we]re
provided for the first time in history and for the first time in interna-
tional law, [a] treaty contain[ed] a universally accepted definition of
the child.”152 The CRC is ideally situated to provide a better, more
durable legal framework for protecting the rights of all children, but
especially those who are otherwise outside the scope of domestic legal
protections that tend to be in place for children who enjoy class, ra-
cial, language, religious, sexual-orientation, gender-identity, and im-
migration-status privilege. The CRC “enshrines all main traditional
groups of human rights: economic, social, cultural, political and
149. Minow, supra note 46, at 1–2.
150. Id. at 6.
151. See generally S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107-4 (2002).
152. See Vučković-Šahović, supra note 128, at 48.
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civil.”153 There is ample evidence that the children are not all right,
which should renew motivation to act.
Domestically and abroad, children’s situations and outcomes con-
tinue to be extremely disparate. David Lancey, author of The Anthro-
pology of Childhood, notes that currently, “these are the best of times
and the worst of times” for children.154 Children in highly developed,
wealthy communities are more likely to have a surfeit of attention and
resources, which results in them being overfed, having access to too
much digital media, and having every moment programmed for them
in a race to prepare for a successful adulthood.155 In contrast, the vast
majority of the world’s children suffer from a general lack of resources
and attention, as evidenced by high rates of extreme poverty, food and
shelter insecurity, lack of educational opportunities, various forms of
exploitation, and the ongoing effects of natural disasters and other
conflicts.156 In 2013, Special Rapporteur Gulnara Shahinian disclosed
statistics about forced labor, noting the high numbers in each region
and observing that women and children were particularly vulnerable
to contemporary slavery since women often provide for children and
are often restricted from education.157 Child soldiers continue to be
recruited, despite the fact that most states158 ratified the OPAC, agree-
ing to not recruit children younger than eighteen years of age.159 The
sexual exploitation of children is now understood to encompass the
interlinked phenomenon of sex tourism, online sexual predation, child
prostitution, children in underage marriages,160 and the rape and sex-
ual assault of children as a weapon of war.161  In 2015, 5.9 million chil-
dren under the age of five died from deaths that could have been
153. Id.
154. LANCY, supra note 12, at 24.
155. Id. at 26–29, 72.
156. Id. at 12–13, 24.
157. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery, Including its Causes and Consequences, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/
43 (July 1, 2013) (citing the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) report about
the prevalence of forced labor in regions and reasons behind higher rates of women
and children in forced labor).
158. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Differ-
ence?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1976–77 (2002). At last count, 193 countries ratified the
CRC. Id. There are some arguments that those that ratify the fastest are the likeliest
to violate treaty norms the most egregiously. Id. However, there is a significant case
to be made for states like the United States to ratify based on its global position and
history of upholding treaty mandates that it does ratify. Id.
159. Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 4; OPAC Status, CHILD SOLDIERS INI-
TIATIVE, http://childsoldiersworldindex.org/opac-status [https://perma.cc/9577-4BVN].
160. Angela Hawke & Alison Raphael, OFFENDERS ON THE MOVE: GLOBAL
STUDY ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN TRAVEL AND TOURISM 6, 10–11,
57 (2016), https://protectingchildrenintourism.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
Global-Report-Offenders-on-the-Move.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6XS-T8MK].
161. Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2018)
(transcript available at The Nobel Foundation).
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preveted by affordable means of care or prevention,   and nearly half
of the world’s extreme poor are children.162
In response to the human rights challenges that are uniquely chal-
lenging for children, the CRC seeks to intervene and focus attention
on improving children’s lives.163 As stated earlier, nearly all nation-
states have formally ratified the CRC.164 The CRC is a stand-alone,
yet complementary treaty that defines the rights held by children
based on the core human rights treaties (e.g., the International Cove-
nant in Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant of So-
cial, Economic, and Cultural Rights; and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).165 Chil-
dren who live in states that have ratified and progressively imple-
mented the CRC receive practical benefits as a cause of the
implementation. Although opponents of ratifying the CRC might find
traction in arguing that there are states that have ratified the CRC yet
have failed to implement it, that discussion is outside the scope of this
Article. Treaty ratification rates tend to be high without correspond-
ingly high implementation rates166 but, at the very least, once formally
accepted by a government, the treaty lays the groundwork for expres-
sive lawmaking.167
International human rights treaties designed to protect children
may be perceived as ineffective168 when measured quantitatively by
ratification rates or on-the-ground evidence of implementation, capac-
ity building, and enforcement of the human rights mandates.169
Rather, a positive view should be taken that treaties such as the CRC
are valuable because they are expressive, providing the opportunity
for important “position-taking” and norm setting that states can aspire
to adopt and implement.170 Substantively, the CRC principles are the
product of multiple constituencies working together to form a coher-
ent framework for extending legal protection to children from multi-
ple cultural and economic backgrounds.171 Viewing the CRC as a
“tool, not a rule”172 means that it is not a code that is simply dropped
162. The State Of The World’s Children 2016: A Fair Chance For Every Child,
UNICEF 10 (2016),  https://www.unicef.org/media/50076/file/UNICEF_SOWC_2016-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/54M5-4VQZ].
163. Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 4.
164. Hathaway, supra note 158, at 1935, 1977.
165. Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 4.
166. See Hathaway, supra note 158, at 1940, 1981; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton &
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to
Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RSCH. 407, 409 (2007).
167. See Hathaway, supra note 158, at 2006.
168. See id. at 1956; Eric A. Posner, Martii Koskenniemi on Human Rights: An Em-
pirical Perspective 5 (U. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 467, 2014).
169. See Hathaway, supra note 158, at 1940, 1956, 1989.
170. Id. at 2011; Vissing, supra note 2, at 80.
171. Revaz, supra note 3, at 13.
172. Vissing, supra note 2, at 80.
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on a state wholesale but is an ideological lodestar for creating solu-
tions tailored for each state’s particular circumstances while upholding
universal human rights principles.173 To focus on the norm-setting
value of international human rights treaties requires an in-depth dis-
cussion of norms (particularly as norms shift beliefs and/or behaviors)
to distinguish norm-setting value from the valuation of laws as imple-
mented behavior.174
After a formal legislative or executive ratification of a treaty, there
is plenty of cover for groundswell activism and external, third-party
actors to begin the work of implementation.175 Examples of ground-
swell approaches that have been successful are the adoption of human
rights principles,176 the increase of domestic prosecutions,177 and the
use of peer countries to persuade treaty members to withdraw reser-
vations to core human rights treaties.178 Groundswell approaches
demonstrate that once new norms are accepted and begin to change a
country’s legal landscape, there is implicit authorization for domestic
legal systems to begin implementation under color of law.179 Further-
more, there is evidence that advanced economic states like those of
the European Union that have ratified and embraced the CRC, are
already benefiting children.180 As Ursula Kilkelly notes, the European
Court of Human Rights has made a “considerable contribution” to
child law and policy across Europe by drawing on the provisions of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international chil-
drens’ rights standards and applying them to children’s cases.181 With-
out the CRC, there would continue to be little law and policy from
which to draw when making legal decisions about children.182 Cur-
rently, U.S. family law scholars, Douglas NeJaime, Clare Huntington,
and Courtney Joslin, are working on a comparative social parenthood
project comparing European and U.S. legal family ordering sys-
tems.183 In European systems, the CRC requires legal decision-makers
to consider the BIOC at the outset of processes that will impact chil-
dren. In comparison, the U.S. legal ordering system places emphasis
173. Id.
174. See Hathaway, supra note 158, at 1941.
175. Id. at 1957.
176. Tamara Relis, Human Rights and Southern Realities, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 509, 546
(2011).
177. Verónica Michel & Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights Prosecutions and the Par-
ticipation of Rights Victims in Latin America, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 873, 903 (2013).
178. ÇALI & MONTOYA, supra note 111, at 34.
179. See Hathaway, supra note 158, at 1957.
180. Ursula Kilkelly, The Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights? Interpreting
the European Convention on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 308, 326 (2001).
181. Id. at 308–09.
182. Id. at 311.
183. Interview with Douglas NeJaime, Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Nov. 25,
2020).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL301.txt unknown Seq: 26 19-APR-21 10:01
520 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
on the parent-child relationship.184 There are positive signs of legisla-
tive reforms featuring a child-first approach, such as the changes made
in the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, that expressly use the BIOC test
when considering parentage claims.185
If the United States ratifies the CRC, the greatest legal benefit that
could redound to children is a conceptual shift toward recognizing
children as rights holders because of their status as human children.186
Although there are forty-two articles that make up the CRC, Cris
Revaz argues that the overarching legal framework of the CRC seeks
to accomplish the following objectives: (1) implementing the BIOC
standard for decisions or actions affecting the child; (2) eliminating
discrimination against the child; (3) acknowledging the child has the
right to survival and development in physical, spiritual, economic, ed-
ucational, and all other aspects of the child’s life; and (4) recognizing
the child has a right to be heard and the right to freedom of expres-
sion.187 Importantly, at its root, the CRC recognizes that children are
rights holders in their own right,188 despite the fact that they cannot
exercise their rights without the assistance of adults and/or the
state.189 The CRC can act as both a sword and a shield to advocate for
greater protection from the state and to guard against an overly ag-
gressive state.190 Balancing the need to obtain state protection from
third parties, including at times parents and caregivers, with the man-
date to also protect children from the state itself means that the CRC
has to be flexible and capacious enough to properly balance compet-
ing interests.191
One measure of progress for children’s rights advocates in the
United States is the growth of non-government organizations
(“NGOs”) and think tanks that provide support, research, and fund-
ing for the protection of children’s rights.192 NGOs and think tanks
appear to be growing in strength and number.193 Yvonne Vissing
predicts that norms will change organically through an emerging
“child rights movement” to create the conditions necessary for ratify-
ing the CRC.194 Although uncoordinated as of yet, Vissing is optimis-
tic that local efforts will create the groundswell of support needed to
drive the campaign to ratify the CRC. As a part of this overall organic
184. Id.
185. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2017) §§ 607 (adjudicating genetic parental claims),
608 (adjudicating presumed parental claims).
186. See Vissing, supra note 2, at 94.
187. Revaz, supra note 3, at 9.
188. Id. at 10. (“The CRC broadly reflects the view that the child is not a chattel,
but a human being in his or 1her own right.”).
189. Id. at 10–11.
190. Id. at 10.
191. Id.
192. See Vissing, supra note 2, at 88.
193. Id. at 88, 92–93.
194. Id. at 87–95.
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child rights movement, there continues to be a need for insiders in
courts who can create the intentional, incremental shifting of norms
necessary for the CRC principles to become normalized in the dis-
course about children and their rights vis-à-vis their parents and the
state.
In addition to sources of advocacy for children’s rights outside the
institution of United States courts, there are signs of progress being
made by insiders with the integration of international human rights
law in a few critical cases. Cases such as Beharry v. Ashcroft,195 Law-
rence v. Texas,196 Ayala-Caballero v. Coleman,197 and Naoum v. Attor-
ney General of U.S.198 show some reliance on international precedent,
but not wholehearted reliance and adoption of international legal pre-
cedent.199 In contrast, the United States penal system shows greater
signs of change toward accepting international human rights law;
human rights cases that move through the state courts up to the fed-
eral courts are beginning to appeal to the value of international
human rights rules.200 One of the few standout cases that acknowl-
edges international influence is Roper v. Simmons, which abolished
the death penalty for minor children in the United States.201 In Roper,
the paragraph that references international law does so with a caveat
and cabins off international law as purely persuasive: “The opinion of
the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does pro-
vide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclu-
sions.”202 The Court’s sentiment may seem as though it is too little too
late to affect the lives of upwards of 200,000 children processed each
year as adults in United States courts,203 but it is a significant break-
through that promises continued progress. Recently, the movement
toward acknowledging and being persuaded by international legal
sources, particularly in the area of children’s rights, has been success-
ful in the area of juvenile justice initiatives.204 These initiatives are
rooted in United States civil rights concerns based on the unequal
treatment of children because of racial identity.205 For example, one of
195. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 55 (2003).
196. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
197. Ayala-Caballero v. Coleman, 58 F. App’x 669, 672 (9th Cir. 2002).
198. Naoum v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
199. Ursula Kilkelly, Strengthening the Framework for Enforcing Children’s Rights:
An Integrated Approach, in CHILDREN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: PROGRESS AND CHAL-
LENGES FOR CHILDREN WORLDWIDE 71–73 (Mark Ensalaco & Linda C. Majka eds.,
2005).
200. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576–78 (2005).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 578.
203. Children and Adolescents in the United States’ Adult Criminal Justice System,
supra note 77, at 9.
204. Dohrn, supra note 22, at 83–84.
205. Id. at 73–74.
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the main drivers in juvenile justice cases, such as Roper206  and Miller
v. Alabama,207 was the data gathered about the unequal treatment of
children of color.208
Rather than simply addressing juvenile justice as a concern because
of children’s status as children, both the principle of unequal treat-
ment based on racial identity and the international human rights prin-
ciple embodied in the CRC would prevent children from being
sentenced with the death penalty.209 In the United States, children of
color at every stage of the process, including the pipeline from family
removal to foster care and then to juvenile delinquency proceedings
and jail, are consistently overrepresented.210 One could argue that
supplying scientific evidence to courts about children’s diminished ca-
pacity is an oblique effort to demonstrate that childhood should be
treated as a legal status.
However, in United States juvenile justice cases, neuroscience and
physiological evidence were supplied to the courts in tandem with the
civil rights aspect of the juvenile justice cause advocacy.211 Without
the civil rights aspect, it is difficult to imagine that the cases would
have had much traction with the court. The continued use of rhetoric
about the overrepresentation of children of color involved in criminal
cases, sounding in equal protection—treating all children the same,
regardless of racial identity—does not result in sustainable change for
all children.212 The United States has a past and present full of racial
injustice, manifested in the hugely disproportionate number of people
of color regulated by the state in negative ways—either through wel-
fare and dependency or through the criminal justice system.213 For the
children’s criminal cases, in large part because the crimes are so seri-
ous, children are often tried in adult criminal court, demonstrating an
206. 543 U.S. at 578–79.(abolishing the death penalty for juveniles).
207. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that juvenile life without
the possibility of parole is unconstitutional).
208. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–2, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633), 2004 WL 1636450; Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4–5, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012) (No. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 135045.
209. Children and Adolescents in the United States’ Adult Criminal Justice System,
supra note 77, at 70–71 (2018).
210. Id. at 71.
211. See Hilary Rosenthal, Scanning for Justice: Using Neuroscience to Create a
More Inclusive Legal System, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 290, 303 (2019); see also
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72 (relying on prior precedents’ use of neuroscience technol-
ogy to differentiate between adolescents and adults); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68 (2010) (using recent neuroscience findings to support inherent differences in deci-
sion-making between adolescents and adults).
212. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage Among
Class-Privileged People of Color, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2018); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Com-
munities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
213. See Bridges, supra note 212, at 124; Roberts, supra note 212, at 1272.
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underlying belief that the seriousness and adult-like nature of behav-
iors214 signifies a child’s heightened capacity instead of a child’s
heightened susceptibility to influence and coercion and the child’s un-
developed decision-making abilities.215 Often, the children prosecuted
in such cases received worse sentences than adults convicted of the
same crimes.216
The intertwining of racially-informed civil rights is not a negative
movement, and it should not be ignored or undermined. Rather, to
make the next move to implement fully the greatest legal protection
available, the United States should look to international human rights
legal precedents to recognize and protect all children’s rights because
of their status as children and rights holders. In doing so, more chil-
dren would have greater legal protection because protection would
not just come from race-based discriminatory externalities. While cer-
tainly race, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, class, religion,
national origin, and other external identities should continue to in-
form decision-making and data gathering to guard against the unequal
treatment of similarly situated persons, moving the baseline toward
treating all children well because of their status as human children
would be a significant positive gain. Identity markers beyond that of
human childhood should not have to exist for children to be treated
well, just as they should not authorize the worse treatment of some
children as compared to others.
What should be a very compelling motivating factor for ratifying the
CRC is the positive economic benefit to be had for significantly more
children; the CRC aims directly at improving well-being through de-
creasing poverty. The famous “concentric circle” model by Stefan de
Vylder demonstrates the positive macroeconomic benefits of the
CRC.217 The concept at the heart of de Vylder’s model is that of anti-
poverty aims.218 At the very center of the concentric circles lie the
“policies and legislation which explicitly target children, ‘such as pro-
vision[s] of primary health and education, and regulations against ex-
214. See William Binchy, The Adult Activities Doctrine in Negligence Law, 11 WIL-
LIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 733, 735 (1985) (stating United States torts principles allow
children to bear civil liability when engaged in adult-like activities); Jackson v. Mc-
Cuiston, 448 S.W.2d 33, 33, 35 (Ark. 1969) (explaining adult-like activities can include
driving a tractor off of a main road or highway); Goodfellow v. Coggburn, 560 P.2d
873, 874 (Idaho 1977).
215. See Dohrn, supra note 22, at 83 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69
(2010) (regarding a child’s diminished capacity to resist influence and become impli-
cated in felony murder cases)).
216. See Sarri & Shook, supra note 10, at 209 (explaining that children convicted of
aggravated assault received prison sentences more often than adults).
217. MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 62
(2003) (citing STEFAN DE VYLDER, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, MACRO-ECONOMIC
POLICIES AND THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 9 (1996)).
218. Id.
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ploitative child labour.’”219 In the next circle, there are “policies and
institutions that have a strong, but more indirect effect, and which are
basically mediated through their impact on the child’s family and par-
ents.”220 These institutions that have a strong, indirect effect on chil-
dren, mediated through families (what better description of United
States domestic relations courts?), could be the site for interventions
that intertwine CRC principles about the fundamental humanity of
children with anti-poverty objectives envisioned by de Vylder. An-
other related argument for ratifying the CRC imagines using the CRC
as an instrument to boost reform in the United States welfare and
dependency system that exists as “‘a patchwork of federal, state and
county dollars reaching into the billions,’ which are not sufficiently
integrated and lack accountability to the child.”221 Considering the
stunning number of children living in poverty in the United States, as
reported by Phillip Alston, and the extremely large amount of money
that may not be reaching children, it is incumbent that the United
States consider solutions like the CRC while fighting against child-
hood poverty.222
IV. RADICAL REFORM IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS
One way to implement aspirational human rights mandates and
maximize potential impact may be to find domestic settings that are
particularly responsive to norm-setting.223 Rather than attempting a
formal adoption and implementation method for integrating interna-
tional human rights into the domestic system, it is possible to take the
approach used by other countries when there has been resistance to
the principles in international human rights treaties.224 By finding a
norms-responsive legal setting, the work of normalizing new norms—
and even the implementation of said norms—can be done before for-
mal ratification, much like the progress made in other countries.225
The CRC is a uniquely appropriate convention for a nation like the
United States to use as a model for deriving principles to respond to
complex international issues that are becoming domestically salient.
Combining the norms-setting expressive function of adopting chil-
dren’s human rights principles with the unique conditions that make
219. Id.
220. ASHER BEN-ARIEH ET AL., MEASURING AND MONITORING CHILDREN’S
WELL-BEING 57 (7th ed. 2001).
221. Kimberly Svevo-Cianci & Sonia C. Velazquez, Companion Piece, Convention
on the Rights of the Child Special Protection Measures: Overview of Implications and
Value for Children in the United States, 89 CHILD WELFARE 139, 140 (2010) (citation
omitted).
222. See generally Alston, supra note 16.
223. Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks in
International and Regional Politics, 51 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 89 (1999).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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institutions susceptible to change—in this case, domestic relations
courts—is a way for children’s rights advocates to normalize the prin-
ciple of children as human rights holders and create value in interna-
tional human rights law through “conversion.” The “conversion”
process by which “institutional challengers may be able to exploit its
inherent ambiguities in ways that allow them to redirect it toward
more favorable functions and effects”226 is a methodology well-suited
to domestic relations courts. In this case, to change the United States’s
children’s rights norms to include international human rights princi-
ples, “conversion” could provide progress-minded institutional players
with a strategy for incrementally changing the courts to begin speak-
ing in the language of international human rights principles without
requiring them to advocate for the larger, external change of ratifica-
tion to a different branch of government.227 In both content and pro-
cess, domestic relations courts are uniquely well-positioned to begin
incremental change through “conversion” while holding out the as-
pirational vision of transformative change to the system at large.
United States domestic relations courts are currently a site for con-
templating children’s interests. Everyday matters, including children’s
welfare and dependency, divorce, and custody, have a close relation-
ship with social norms and legal decision-making. Thus, introducing
and adopting international human rights norms found in the CRC
could be a natural place of growth for an institution susceptible to
change because of the capacity to be flexible in the shifting norms. It
could also be the setting for conscious, deliberate change through in-
stitutional change theory. Rather than waiting for legislative solutions
that cannot be realized because there is no underlying acceptance of
external legal frameworks—i.e., political resistance to ratifying the
CRC—advocates should begin intentionally strategizing now to im-
plement the CRC’s principles into practice. While there are efforts
being made by NGOs and other third-party actors within the state
institution itself, there is currently no path forward for formally ratify-
ing and implementing the CRC in the United States.228 Supporting
external NGOs with internal, intentional action within the legal sys-
tem could provide the impetus for transformative change.
In domestic relations courts, sweeping change does not typically
happen in response to “big shocks”; instead it comes from “incremen-
tal change with transformative results.”229 One has only to look at
Kimberly Richman’s collection of fifty years of case law from United
States domestic relations courts to see the slow build toward parenting
226. Mahoney & Thelen , supra note 27, at 17–18.
227. See id. at 17–28.
228. See Vissing, supra note 2, at 88, 92–93.
229. BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL
ECONOMIES 9 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005).
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equality for gay and lesbian parents.230 Fifty years may seem too long
to wait for change to an institution. However, the change reflected in
Richman’s data set demonstrates that although there were few cases
at the beginning, during the last decade the cases increased in number
and quality such that most of the progress was made very quickly rela-
tive to the amount of time captured by the data set.231 Alison Gash’s
theory is that civil rights advocacy performed in relatively unseen, un-
monitored spaces can be vital to success in securing rights.232 While
advocacy work that Richman has captured is critical, the next phase of
advocacy for parenting equality is ongoing. Not surprisingly, given the
growing social acceptance of LGBT families, cases have shifted from
contested custody cases between heterosexual and homosexual par-
ents to questions of parentage.233 NeJaime’s study of three non-bio-
logical lesbian mothers’ quest for parentage in California234 is an
example of continuing incremental progress and a shift toward parent-
age in cause-advocacy work. Goldberg’s analysis of the Alison D. case
is an example of cause advocacy performed in the understated setting
of domestic relations courts.235
Ironically, the same system that can incorporate progressive ideals
over a relatively short amount of time is also susceptible to absorbing
less-than-ideal norms. An example of how quickly norms are ab-
sorbed is the quasi-scientific phenomenon of “parental alienation syn-
drome.” Although lacking in any reliable or credible scientific testing
or theory, the so-called syndrome was introduced through father’s
rights advocacy groups into domestic relations courts.236 Within only a
few years, it infiltrated multiple courts and became a basis for granting
greater custodial and visiting privileges to fathers.237 Even after the
scientific community roundly condemned the practice of relying on
230. See KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 179–87 (2009).
231. See id.
232. ALISON L. GASH, BELOW THE RADAR: HOW SILENCE CAN SAVE CIVIL
RIGHTS 5–6 (2015) (detailing how quietly advocating for rights can prevent backlash
from political opponents).
233. RICHMAN, supra note 230, at 166.
234. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1187, 1222–29 (2016).
235. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation: Unrecog-
nized Parents and the Story of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
307 (2008).
236. Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental
Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers’ Rights, 40 FAM. L. Q. 315,
315–16, 326 (2006).
237. Joan S. Meier, U.S. Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving Parental
Alienation and Abuse Allegations: What Do the Data Show?, 42 J. SOC. WELFARE &
FAM. L. 1, 6–8 (2020) (showing that when mothers alleged abuse and fathers alleged
alienation, fathers prevailed by a significant percentage over mothers in custody
determinations).
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“parental alienation syndrome,” the idea still persists in courts.238 It
became a “sticky” idea that cannot seem to be shaken despite the
dearth of scientific evidence for the idea.239 If ideas that are harmful
to children are that easy to introduce to courts, it is that much more
compelling for children’s rights advocates to introduce strategically
child-positive concepts into courts.
The CRC provides a core concept—children as rights holders be-
cause of their status as human beings—that is simple in theory, but
from which so many radical and positive reforms could spring that it
would be a tragic oversight to miss the opportunity to make it availa-
ble to courts that have direct contact with children. Imagine that chil-
dren’s views, interests, and desires were considered, not as
aspirational matters, but as matters of protecting their legal rights.
The current climate change litigation,240 the aftermath of mass shoot-
ings like Parkland,241 Sandy Hook,242 or the West Nickel Mines243 that
took the lives of several school children, and the detention centers at
the United States and Mexico border244 are a few examples of the
areas where there are gaps between children’s rights and legal reme-
dies that are child-centric. Attacking the problems that detrimentally
affect children’s rights to live in a safe, ecologically sustainable envi-
ronment free of violence, poverty, and separation from their
caregivers through legislation or the executive branch of government
does not fundamentally differ from the current approach of adults ad-
vocating for children’s protection. The key difference in treating chil-
dren as rights-holders instead of objects of protection is that children
would have a voice and causes of action for the harms they suffer,
238. Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of
Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249, 250 (2001).
239. Adams, supra note 236, at 326.
240. See Juliana v. United States, OUR CHILD.’S TR., https://www.ourchildrenstrust.
org/juliana-v-us (Mar. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/NAH6-LZFE]; Press Release, Our
Children’s Trust, Decision of Divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Finds Primarily
for Juliana Plaintiffs, but Holds Federal Judiciary Can Do Nothing to Stop the U.S.
Government in Causing Climate Change and Harming Children (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5e22508873d1bc
4c30fad90d/1579307146820/Juliana+Press+Release+1-17-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH
9X-XNVL] (citing the court’s opinion that, “federal courts cannot provide the youth
with a remedy for their climate change injuries,” and instead urging them to consider
executive and legislative remedies).
241. Dakin Andone, It’s Been 2 Years Since the Deadly Shooting at a High School
in Parkland, Florida, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/14/us/parkland-shooting-
marjory-stoneman-douglas-2-years/index.html (Feb. 14, 2020, 11:16 AM) [https://
perma.cc/5GFL-M6XQ].
242. Sandy Hook School Shootings Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/
07/us/connecticut-shootings-fast-facts/index.html (Dec. 2, 2020, 6:24 PM) [https://
perma.cc/LM5S-WXXU].
243. David Kocieniewski & Gary Gately, Man Shoots 11, Killing 5 Girls, in Amish
School, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/us/
03amish.html [https://perma.cc/K9MB-8MVC].
244. Nixon, supra note 76.
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providing a legal avenue for advocacy and recourse. The fight should
be taken to places where it is normal to consider the interests of the
child at bar, not the interests of all children everywhere. It is possible
that in learning how to truly take children’s rights seriously, and not
merely as a cover for adults’ rights, on an individual basis and using
principles that stress the value of all children, advocacy for children’s
rights writ large can be realized.
After more than twenty years since the creation of the CRC, it
would seem that a new approach to motivating the United States to
ratify the CRC should be taken. In the United States, there is little-to-
no understanding of capacity building and no desire to implement in-
ternational treaties, leaving few options except to utilize institutional
change theory to realize international human rights law in the present
to create the conditions for ratification. In addition to the continuing
efforts of lobbyists, NGOs, and other advocacy networks, institutional
players themselves should join in the work of promoting children’s
rights. The time is now to begin strategically harnessing settings where
legal advocacy has been driven through case-by-case incremental wins
and slow-moving normalization of new standards rather than a top-
down federalism legal “imposition” of political ideology.
Acrimonious partisan rhetoric in the United States continues to
present obstacles to both international human rights treaty ratifica-
tion245 and fulfilling the aims of the CRC.246 Social and religious con-
servative political rhetoric undermines the possibility of international
influence in spaces believed to be almost sacred legal doctrine—those
of family privacy.247 On the national stage, partisan debates and en-
trenched positions can be maintained and deployed for political gain,
but at the domestic level, judges cannot embrace deeply partisan
stances without running the risk of losing elections, being removed for
cause, or not being reappointed. There are some judges in regions of
the United States who are supported in their socially conservative de-
cisions, but those judges tend to become outliers quickly by their deci-
sions either being overturned by higher courts or being out of step
with other state jurisdictions addressing similarly situated litigants.
Thus, domestic courts are extremely responsive to norm setting be-
cause judges must address the person(s) at bar, not imagined figures
presented as part of a national partisan narrative. The reality of do-
mestic relations courts is that the lives and well-being of individual
245. See Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race
Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 321, 328 (2010).
246. See generally Jeffrey S. Peake, Coalition Building and Overcoming Legislative
Gridlock in Foreign Policy, 1947-98, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 67 (2002).
247. See Soo Jee Lee, Note, A Child’s Voice vs. a Parent’s Control: Resolving a
Tension Between the Convention on the Rights of the Child and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 687, 700–01 (2017); T. Jeremy Gunn, The Religious Right and the Opposition
to U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 111, 124 (2006).
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children and families are at stake. It is perhaps more difficult to ra-
tionalize unfairness, ignore expert findings, or maintain willful blind-
ness to the best interests of the family and child(ren) at bar than to
make sweeping generalizations in political settings. For example,
when a child who experiences depression, suicidal ideation, and self-
harm because of a desire to be identified as a gender different from
the child’s birth gender appears before a judge (and offers expert
medical findings), partisan views about trans children should not be
permitted to inform a legal opinion about the best interests of the
child at bar. While the judge could have very different personal be-
liefs, judges who follow professional judicial ethical guidelines do not
permit their personal beliefs to cloud their legal judgment. In this way,
over time, advocacy groups have improved the lives of marginalized
and disfavored family groups. Working women, single mothers, gen-
der-non-conforming men, parents with disabilities, and lesbian and
gay parents represent a few of the groups that have advocated and
won incremental progress in domestic relations courts.
The norms that domestic courts are particularly responsive to in-
clude: (1) basing decisions on social science evidence; (2) valuing
health outcomes data; and (3) having a strong interest in extra-juris-
dictional social-legal trends that impact families. Some might argue
that other courts (i.e., juvenile criminal cases) perform the same func-
tions. This is not a zero-sum game; multiple court settings can be har-
nessed for furthering the cause of international human rights
principles. The argument here is that domestic relations courts are
uniquely situated to introduce a norm that is critical to embracing the
CRC’s larger goals—that of recognizing the ability of children to be
rights holders based on their status as human children. While that ar-
gument could have been made in the realm of juvenile justice, the civil
rights and equal protection thread of the argument was selected as a
more persuasive tool to gain leverage with the courts and in the minds
of the populace who often mistakenly see children of color as older
than they are and as much more dangerous than white children. How-
ever, since children are likely to engage with domestic relations courts
(regardless of their fit within a constitutionally protected suspect
class) because of  overwhelmingly common domestic legal matters, ar-
guments about the human status of all children in domestic courts can
have greater traction. With the understanding that domestic relations
courts are often engaged in the business of working out cases on the
bench regarding what the best interests of a child are at any given
moment, it is not surprising that courts rely on external sources for
guidance.
Courts are becoming increasingly familiar with social science evi-
dence based on processing large swathes of data and longitudinal
studies when making decisions about children. Social science out-
comes were used to change laws regarding parenting equality. Studies
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like those performed by Charlotte Patterson, a longitudinal study of
minor children with lesbian and gay parents,248 combined with
Nanette Gartrell’s data following lesbian parents for over seventeen
years249 contributed to a reversal in the law that prevented lesbian and
gay parents from receiving custody without any opportunity to
demonstrate parental fitness.250 As with juvenile justice advocacy,
neurologists investigate minor children’s capacity to make decisions;
evidence from big data supports the suggestion that minor children’s
decision-making capacity is diminished as compared to a fully-devel-
oped adult.251 Another area where social science has improved deci-
sion-making is comparing data sets of married versus single parents.
The popular belief that heterosexual pairings were the gold standard
for marriage has been disrupted by a granular review of the data sets
available.252 The comparison between single mothers and married het-
erosexual couples did not account for the baseline difference in in-
come and attention from adults flowing to the children. Rather than
suggesting that parents needed to be heteronormative to be success-
ful, the data suggests that children with more than one parent or adult
contributing income and attention tend to do better than those with
less.253 That does not mean a single parent is, by definition, going to
have a worse outcome; many single parents build networks that oper-
ate much like a heteronormative family structure.254 The careful re-
view of data also suggests that the gender of the parents is not
instrumental in the outcomes for the children.255 Therefore, it is not
requisite for a child to have a father and a mother. Rather, having
more than one parental figure produces the best outcomes.256 The fo-
cus in social science data is now on attachment as a part of a child’s
development. The social workers’ brief in the case of Brooke S. B.
exemplifies the turn toward developmental science.257
248. See generally Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 15
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 241 (2006).
249. See generally Nanette K. Gartrell, Henny M.W. Bos, & Naomi G. Goldberg,
Adolescents of the U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Sexual Orienta-
tion, Sexual Behavior, and Sexual Risk Exposure, 40 ARCH. SEX BEHAV. 1199 (2011).
250. See generally RICHMAN, supra note 230 (tracking the relaxation of legal stan-
dards imposed on parents deemed per se unfit to parent because of sexual orientation
status over time).
251. See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Trevor W. Robbins, Decision-Making in the Ad-
olescent Brain, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1184, 1186 (2012).
252. See LESLIE COOPER & PAUL CATES, TOO HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE AGAINST
RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING ch. 4 & ch. 6 (2d ed. 2006).




257. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Social Workers, the Na-
tional Association of Social Workers’ New York State Chapter, and the National As-
sociation of Social Workers’ New York City Chapter in Support of Petitioner-
Respondent, Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., No. APL-2015-00236, 7–16 (March 18,
2016).
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Health outcomes serve to broaden the scope of factors that courts
can consider during legal determinations about a child’s best interest.
Courts cited to health outcomes when making child custody decisions
regarding bonding between the parent and child.258 What used to be
the tender years doctrine based on social norms of motherhood and
young children was reversed because it was perceived as sexist.259
Health-outcome data now shows that bonding and attachment shortly
after birth is critical for neurological and physiological develop-
ment.260 The health-outcome data does not mandate that it has to be
the birth mother providing care but does strongly suggest that chil-
dren have better health outcomes during the newborn and early de-
velopmental stages when they are nurtured by a parent or parents.261
While there are equal protection concerns that prohibit a court from
wholesale mandating that women who give birth to children must pro-
vide personal care to their children, there is data to support a mother’s
choice to breastfeed and provide care for a child.262 If a judge were
ordering a schedule for equally fit parents to have time with a child,
considering health-outcome data might militate toward creating a visi-
tation schedule that supports one parent’s ability to breastfeed rather
than pedantically dividing a week in half without regard for the child’s
or breastfeeding woman’s schedule. In cases where childhood obesity
impacts custody decisions,263 court decisions are inconsistent.264 Al-
though it is evident that obesity is harmful to a child’s health, it is
unclear that a parent controls a child’s weight gain in the same way
that a parent might harm a child by keeping the child on an overly
restrictive diet.265 In cases where parents have insisted on a vegan or
vegetarian diet for their children that has resulted in severely under-
nourishing their children, courts have removed the children to prevent
258. Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the
Child Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody,
25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2005); Tiffany Korte, Comment, Terminally Ill
Parents and Their Children: Determining the Proper Placement of Children Through
the Best Interests of the Child or the Parental Preference Standard, 17 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 161, 166 (2015).
259. See generally WEISBERG, supra note 56, at 662–65 (7th ed. 2020).
260. Robert Winston & Rebecca Chicot, The Importance of Early Bonding on the
Long-Term Mental Health and Resilience of Children, 8 LONDON J. PRIMARY CARE
12, 12 (2016).
261. Id. at 12; see generally Jeannette Crenshaw, Care Practice #6: No Separation of
Mother and Baby, With Unlimited Opportunities for Breastfeeding, 16 J. PERINATAL
EDUC. 39 (2007).
262. Kim H. Pearson, Chemical Kids, 24 TEX. J. WOMEN, GENDER, & L. 67, 83–84
(2014); Winston & Chicot, supra note 260, at 13; see generally Crenshaw, supra note
261.
263. Pearson, supra note 262, at 80.
264. Jenna T. Hayes & Lorie L. Sicafuse, Is Childhood Obesity a Form of Child
Abuse? Factors to Consider in Judicial Rulings, 94 JUDICATURE 20, 21–22 (2010).
265. Id. at 25.
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further harm.266 Childhood obesity does not operate in the same way.
The few attempts to remove children from parents because of the
harmful nature of obesity have been met with popular resistance.267
Finally, courts have relied on health outcomes to restrict the use of
substances during pregnancy. Dorothy Roberts critiques the regula-
tion and criminalization of women of color through restrictions on
their prenatal behavior.268 Even though this is a contested space, the
example demonstrates that courts rely heavily on health outcomes to
regulate other behaviors.269
Courts look to extra-jurisdictional decisions because of quickly
changing demographics and social norms. It is quite typical for state
courts to check their sister jurisdictions when they have an issue that
they have not seen before. In particular, biotech-related growth areas
such as surrogacy, artificial reproductive technology (“ART”), em-
bryo-freezing and custody, plastic surgery for children, cochlear im-
plants, and hymenal rejuvenation or replacement represent a few of
the issues that are still a patchwork of rulings or are just making their
way through courts now. Heightened consciousness of extra-jurisdic-
tional decision-making most likely derives from the laboratory model
of legal responses to social norm shifts and gaps in rules. That being
the norm and practice, it is a system set up to obtain the best that
“conversion” has to offer. Institutional insiders paired with external
non-institutional actors (NGOs, transnational advocacy groups, etc.)
could engage in “information exchange.”270 They could work together
to build a network to “mobilize information strategically to help cre-
ate new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain
leverage over much more powerful organizations and govern-
ments.”271 Then, institutional insiders could begin deploying ideas and
rhetoric to move the institution toward the CRC’s core principles with
the hope of transformative change in the future. Yanbai Andrea
Wang’s theory that the implementation of treaties, not the “doctrinal
meaning,” in their “complex, decentralized, and oftentimes opaque”
processes leads to transformative change is certainly relevant here.272
266. Mary Elizabeth Williams, Is Veganism Child Abuse?, SALON (June 26, 2014,
6:37 PM), https://www.salon.com/2014/06/26/is_veganism_child_abuse/ [https://
perma.cc/FZF8-TPPH]; Tanya Di Genova & Harvey Guyda, Infants and Children
Consuming Atypical Diets: Vegetarianism and Macrobiotics, 12 PEDIATRICS & CHILD
HEALTH 185, 187 (2007).
267. See generally H.R. Clark et al., How Do Parents’ Child-Feeding Behaviours
Influence Child Weight? Implications for Childhood Obesity Policy, 29 J. PUB.
HEALTH 132 (2007); Genova & Guyda, supra note 266.
268. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
269. Id.
270. Keck & Sikkink, supra note 223, at 65–66, 71.
271. Id. at 89.
272. Yanbai Andrea Wang, The Dynamism of Treaties, 78 MD. L. REV. 828, 848
(2019).
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She argues that “implementation-level changes did not constitute
‘subsequent practice’ for purposes of interpretation under the Vienna
Convention, yet their scope was vast, and they precipitated more for-
mal, legislative updates later on.”273
The most striking example of incremental change leading to a
change in national norms is parenting equality. After over fifty years
of advocating for parenting equality for lesbian and gay parents, the
same arguments that supported keeping children with parents—re-
gardless of sexual orientation—reappeared in legal arguments heard
at the United States Supreme Court. Per Gash’s argument, this advo-
cacy feat was accomplished because it happened quietly over time and
under the radar of national attention.274 The Supreme Court of the
United States’s rulings become federal law, setting the legal standard
for all lower courts. So, although parenting equality is concerned with
parent-child relationships, the idea of marriage equality in the United
States is so strongly intertwined with parenting that marriage equality
needed the incremental evidence of positive incremental change in
domestic relations courts before it could reach the transformative
change allowing marriage equality. There is no reason that a similar
strategy should not be used in efforts to incorporate the baseline ten-
ets of the CRC into United States domestic relations courts. The pos-
sibilities for transformative change could lead to unexpected positive
outcomes for children and families.
V. CONCLUSION
The call to implement the CRC into United States domestic rela-
tions courts through institutional “conversion” is a call to action and a
call for patience. It requires advocates to press forward with an objec-
tive while living with the uncertainty of making slow, uneven progress
toward that objective. There will be case outcomes signaling accept-
ance of the CRC, just as there will be courts that reject the CRC. One
has only to look at the juvenile justice legal landscape to see that pro-
gress in protecting children from life sentences has not been a straight
line from Point A (these punishments are inhumane) to Point B (chil-
dren are no longer subject to such punishments because they are
human children).275 Instead, research and targeted legal action was
required to demonstrate that children have diminished decision-mak-
ing capacity, and the system unfairly punishes children of color and of
273. Id. at 833.
274. GASH, supra note 232.
275. Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Lim-
its and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 554, 560–64 (2015); see generally
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (finding mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010)
(finding life without parole sentences unconstitutional for juveniles who have commit-
ted nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding the
death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional).
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low-income status. Despite the progress in aiding incarcerated minor
children, the current state of the law is again vulnerable to attack by a
United States Supreme Court case that broadens the courts’ ability to
execute incarcerated prisoners without fear of larger social conse-
quences or uprisings. Continuing forward in the face of seeming fail-
ure or defeat of the advocacy objective seems to be inherent in the
project of implementing international human rights law generally, and
definitely in the case of the CRC and the United States.
Calling for advocates to continue taking actions that may be accom-
panied by losses in litigation and advocacy efforts is challenging. Taleb
describes how difficult it is to be a dissenter taking losses over time
when it would be easier to go along with a system that is designed for
short-term wins.276 In The Black Swan, his example of the lone dis-
senter is a trader who is willing to take small losses repeatedly over
time while working toward fewer, but bigger, wins.277 This resulted in
a loss of health and in suffering near daily doubts about himself and
his actions because of the slow, steady losses he incurred.278 In the
end, he won big but only after suffering for a significant amount of
time during which he acted against his own short-term interest.279 In
the same way, it can be lonely, difficult work to advocate for children
when there are significant structural and socio-legal forces arrayed
against children and their advocates. The United States domestic legal
system seems to be set up for immediate wins (i.e., the case of child
custody determinations that focus on parents’ individual arguing for
the BIOC) rather than the longer, demanding challenge of finding
mutually beneficial legal solutions for children, parents, and the state.
If Todres is correct about the substantive political reasons for the
United States’s resistance to the CRC,280 it is also likely that advocacy
groups are correct about the method for pressing forward with imple-
mentation of the CRC without directly addressing politics. Rather
than siding with any particular political agenda or attempting to re-
envision deeply held beliefs about constitutionally protected parenting
interests and rights, advocates should focus on the principles en-
shrined in the CRC without naming them and formally advocating for
ratification.
The value of patiently working on an extended time frame from
multiple angles is that movement in some direction will certainly be
made; the choice about which direction and how that direction is
shaped is an ongoing conversation. The 2018 research report, Realis-
ing Rights? The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Court,
demonstrates that there are various levels of acceptance and imple-




280. Todres, supra note 6, at 20–21.
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mentation of the CRC’s substantive principles across nation-states.281
Many nation-states are implementing the CRC, and their domestic
courts are interacting with the CRC; just as with the change in relig-
ious reservations based on peer-nation influence noted by Başak Çali
and Mariana Montoya,282 so too could the United States be persuaded
by similarly situated peer nations to respond to the CRC. In the alter-
native, the report demonstrates that over time, targeting courts as a
setting for advocacy and implementation of the CRC is a work in pro-
gress with slow, but steady improvements in the recognition and pro-
tection of children’s rights.283
Until such a time, if ever, that the United States acts in its federal
legislative capacity284 to dictate the ratification and implementation of
the CRC, movement toward wholesale acceptance can only come
from forces on the ground. The converging interests of non-govern-
mental advocacy groups, public intellectuals, court officials, and fami-
lies involved with the legal system are all positioned to coordinate and
help transform domestic relations courts in the United States. The
promise of transformative change that incorporates the principles of
the CRC would provide durable, embedded, and substantive content
into the very baseline conceptualization of children and their contact
with the law. Cases and laws that are vulnerable to political capture
are different from the kind of transformative change that institutional
insiders can make. Institutional insiders can enact change like the
BIOC standard that is no longer contested, but at the very heart of the
substantive law for domestic relations legal disputes involving chil-
dren. Rebuttable presumptions that favored parental interests over
children’s, like the “tender years” doctrine, have since been eradi-
cated285 and replaced with a policy that ostensibly focuses on children
first. Now, it would be virtually unthinkable to promulgate laws and
policies that undermine taking the BIOC into account.286 In a similar
way, the CRC’s principles should be integrated into the heart of the
law and policy that touches children. Without diminishing the many
good efforts that other advocates take to implement the CRC, and in
fact, it is in support of all efforts that this narrow call to action and
patience is made. The narrow scope of the call to influence domestic
281. See generally Realising Rights? The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
in Court, CHILD RTS. INT’L NETWORK (2018), https://archive.crin.org/sites/default/
files/uncrc_in_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU3J-PD35].
282. See ÇALI & MONTOYA, supra note 111, at 3.
283. See generally Realising Rights? The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
in Court, supra note 281.
284. Merle H. Weiner, Beyond Other Treaties: The U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child and the Value of “A Dedicated Line”, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
U.S. RATIFICATION 69 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik & Cris R. Revaz eds.,
2006).
285. See WEISBERG, supra note 56, at 665; Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 54.
286. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 55.
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relations courts to implement the CRC principles into cases is in real-
ity a massive undertaking; in the United States, there are fifty states
with numerous state and local courts. The courts represent a writhing
mass of court officials and families wrestling with their individual
problems and swiftly changing political and social norms. And yet, it is
in this spirit of inchoate, yet harmonizing collective efforts that do-
mestic court insiders can position themselves to transform the institu-
tion over time as part of a larger movement. The ability to hold both
the individual legal situation in perspective with the global requires
maintaining a vision that can value both the individual child at bar and
all children in the world as humans deserving of rights.
